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the EU’s External Relations, approved on 17 
November 2009, represents the first attempt 
to establish a clear framework for action for 
EU institutions and member-states in a policy 
field that has traditionally operated in a rather 
scattered and unco-ordinated manner.  
  
Reforms at the institutional and the policy level 
have raised expectations not only amongst 
policy practitioners and experts in the EU, but 
also in partner countries where the lack of a 
more co-ordinated and coherent EU voice in 
external affairs has often been perceived as a 
serious shortcoming in their dealings with the 
EU, particularly when it comes to supporting 
democracy and democratic reforms in third 
countries. 
A new beginning? Democracy support in 
EU external relations under the Lisbon Treaty
In November 2009, the Council of the European Union approved a set of Council 
Conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU’s External Relations, including an 
Agenda for Action. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, and the creation of an 
EU diplomatic service (European External Action Service), an opportunity now exists to 
provide a clear framework for democracy support in EU external relations.  
The European Union’s external relations are in 
flux. The new architecture sanctioned by the 
Lisbon Treaty is meant to change the face and 
the means of the EU’s external action efforts.  
  
At the same time, the EU is engaged in a 
process of profound restructuring of external 
action instruments aimed at both incorporating 
the agenda of aid effectiveness and improving 
co-operation, coherence and complementarity 
of EU efforts.  
  
In this context of political, institutional and 
policy overhaul, the EU’s efforts in the field of 
democracy support have already been subject 
to important developments. In particular, the EU 
Council Conclusions on Democracy Support in 
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
• Prior to the full implementation of the provisions 
of the Lisbon Treaty, the Spanish and Belgian EU 
Council Presidencies, in close co-operation with 
the Council Secretariat and the Office of the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, should lead the establishment of a multi-
stakeholder dialogue mechanism to push forward 
the approved Agenda for Action on democracy 
support in external action. This mechanism should 
include a process for monitoring the implementation 
of the Agenda for Action in pilot countries.  
  
• The European External Action Service (EEAS) 
should feature a broader representation from the 
side of the European Commission, including the 
Directorates-General involved in development 
policy, Enlargement and European Neighbourhood 
Policy, humanitarian aid, and financial manage-
ment of external programmes. 
  
• The EU should develop mechanisms for 
building political consensus and democratisation 
agendas in third countries. This should be done 
by complementing existing technical assistance 
instruments with new tools based on fostering 
political dialogue and local ownership. Similarly, 
the development of country-based political agendas 
for democratic consolidation will establish the basis 
for better alignment of EU democracy support tools 
with locally owned reform agendas.   
  
• The EU democracy support community should 
develop a new range of instruments to work with 
political society in ways that build on the EU’s past 
experience in the field of institutional strengthening 
and capacity-building, especially during the EU 
enlargement to Central Europe. 
  
• The structure of the EEAS should reflect the different 
areas of EU external actions based on geographic 
desks and horizontal policy desks. This scheme 
should include a Unit on Democracy and Human 
Rights that would be in charge of devising policy 
priorities as well as ensuring better mainstreaming 
of human rights and democracy issues across all 
EU external action (geographic desks).
• The EC delegations should improve their capacity 
to implement the European Instrument for Democracy 
and Human Rights (EIDHR) Country-Based Support 
Schemes. This requires not only reinforcing the 
expertise of staff at the delegation level, but also 
devising the necessary methodologies for a more 
inclusive and participatory process of identification 
of policy priorities that will incorporate stakeholders 
on the ground rather than relying exclusively on a 
centrally designed policy framework.  
• The EEAS should develop capacities to work 
on democracy support both at the headquarters 
and at the delegation level. In doing so, recent 
experiences such as the development by the 
Community of Democracies of the Diplomat’s 
Handbook for Democracy Development Support1 
should be taken into consideration as reliable 
and practical mechanisms for structuring capacity-
building and training mechanisms. 
• The EC delegations in relevant countries should 
have a clear mandate and a framework enabling 
them to take rapid-response action to support 
democracy and human rights activists at short notice. 
They should also include staff dedicated to civil 
society engagement and support for democracy and 
human rights, with a strong emphasis on recruiting 
staff with field work experience in democracy 
support and civil society development.
  
• The capacity of civil society has to be nurtured 
in a more consistent manner at every stage of the 
policy-making process: improving consultation 
mechanisms and administrative processes so that 
relations with civil and political stakeholders are 
more effective, and furthering the development of 
independent evaluations of EU policies.  
• The EU and its member-states should open to a 
wider range of policy actors the debate on how to 
improve the role of democracy support in the EU’s 
external relations. The Council Conclusions should 
be discussed with relevant stakeholders in order to 
generate the necessary conditions for improving the 
ownership of a policy process that so far has been 
confined to the selective club of EU member-states.  
1 http://www.diplomatshandbook.org/
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a new External Action Service (the biggest 
diplomatic and external relations service in the 
world) is foreseen. Furthermore, the change of 
the EU’s legal personality makes it a subject of 
international law and therefore a plenipotentiary 
actor in international relations.  
  
However, to what extent will the implementation 
of these reforms bring about changes at the 
policy level, particularly when it comes to a 
field such as democracy support? 
Whereas the “text” of the Lisbon Treaty is 
clear about the organisational changes to be 
implemented upon its entry into force, a more 
contentious process of interpretation of the 
“spirit” of the text is currently taking place in 
Brussels and in the member-states, particularly 
when it comes to establishing a new division 
of labour between EU institutions and member-
states in external relations. 
  
As a result, EU institutions might not be able to 
meet the expectations of stakeholders when it 
comes to necessary policy changes. 
The idea that institutional changes will bring 
about immediate policy results needs to 
be tempered by the reality of slow policy 
developments in the EU; of difficult political and 
institutional battles for the control of resources; 
and of the continuing dominance of member-
states as the driving force behind the process 
of European integration, particularly when it 
comes to the field of external relations. 
 
  
  
ThE EUROPEAN  
ExTERNAL ACTION SERvICE 
  
According to the Lisbon Treaty, “the High 
Representative shall be assisted by a European 
External Action Service (EEAS)”.1 The Treaty 
says that the EEAS “shall work in co-operation 
with the diplomatic services of the member-
states and shall comprise officials from relevant 
departments of the General Secretariat of the 
Council and of the Commission as well as staff 
seconded from national diplomatic services 
1 Treaty on European Union (TEU), Art.13.3
What can be expected from this major policy 
restructuring? And is the EU finally finding a 
unified voice in the field of democracy support? 
This paper aims to tackle these questions. In 
doing so, the paper will review major changes 
brought about by the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty and the approval of the Council 
Conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU’s 
External Relations. 
 
Whereas much of the attention of observers and 
practitioners has been focused on a guessing-
game about the outcomes of the architectural 
reforms, it is in the new policy framework, 
established by the Council Conclusions, that the 
democracy support policy community in Europe 
might find the necessary elements to build a 
more coherent and co-ordinated policy. 
This paper offers a series of policy 
recommendations (see table, page 2) 
designed to ensure harmonisation between 
policy developments and architectural reform.
The Lisbon Treaty  
and EU external action
The Lisbon Treaty has been portrayed as a 
major breakthrough in the consolidation of a 
more cohesive EU external relations policy. 
It has also been seen by some as a threat to 
national sovereignty, since it is expected that it 
will bring greater joint decision-making to the 
actions of EU institutions and member-states in 
third countries. But, does it really mean any of 
this? 
  
There is little doubt that the scope of 
organisational restructuring in the EU’s external 
action is wide-ranging. Apart from the two new 
leading positions (President of the Council, 
and High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, the latter combined with 
Vice-President of the European Commission), 
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i.e. geographic and horizontal policy desks. 
This would help to ensure better co-ordination 
and effectiveness of the existing policy 
instruments. Such a scheme should include a 
Unit on Democracy and Human Rights (or two 
separate Units as has been the case in DG 
RELEX since summer 2009) that would be in 
charge of devising the policy priorities in this 
field, as well as ensuring better mainstreaming 
of human rights and democracy issues in the 
rest of EU external actions (geographic desks). 
  
Similarly, the new EEAS raises concerns about 
the staff selection procedures and the necessary 
capacity-building to operate within the new 
institutional context. Whereas most of the staff 
of the EEAS will come from existing bodies at 
the Commission and the Council (and the rest 
will be seconded from the diplomatic services 
of member-states), it is not clear whether the 
service will be able to develop a common 
framework of norms and practices.  
  
This is particularly relevant when it comes to 
the accommodation of various sensitivities 
regarding issues such as the role of conditionality 
in the EU’s external actions and the value of the 
democracy and human rights clause. 
Likewise, whereas part of the staff might have 
been exposed in the past to work in a multi-
stakeholder environment, it is not clear to 
what extent the EEAS will develop, in the short 
run, clear standards for the incorporation of 
stakeholders into the policy process. 
  
Therefore, it will be necessary to establish clear 
mechanisms for capacity-building that will serve 
to ensure higher standards of inclusiveness 
and transparency in the work of the EEAS, 
particularly when it comes to issues such as 
the role of democracy and human rights in EU 
external actions.   
  
  
DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS 
  
The representation of the EU in third countries will 
be provided by the EEAS through the diplomatic 
missions. Compared with their predecessors, the 
of the member-states”.2 The fact that the final 
decision about the organisation of the EEAS has 
not yet been taken reflects the tensions between 
the political actors when it comes to defining the 
scope and the mechanisms for functioning of the 
EEAS. A blueprint is scheduled to be prepared 
by Catherine Ashton by March 2010.
  
One of the biggest problems is to define the 
composition of the EEAS, and how to strike the 
right balance between the inter-governmental 
and purely communitarian components in EU 
foreign policy.  
  
However, beyond the question of the distribution 
of positions between member-states, the 
Commission and the Council, it is necessary to 
resolve the lack of clarity in the functions of the 
EEAS and the articulation between the EEAS 
and the remnants of the Directorates-General 
for External Relations (RELEX), Development, 
and EuropeAid. 
  
The new structure of the European Commission, 
proposed by President José Manuel Barroso 
and confirmed by the European Parliament 
on 9 February 2010, includes the following 
Directorates-General in the area of external 
relations: 
• International Co-operation, 
    Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response 
• Development 
• Enlargement and European  
    Neighbourhood Policy.  
  
Yet it is not yet clear what kind of mandate 
the Directorates-General will have within the 
new EU architecture. One potential division of 
tasks between the Commission and the EEAS 
might be allocation to the EEAS of the functions 
currently performed by DG RELEX (reinforced by 
the figure of the High Representative), whereas 
the Commission will be responsible for the 
implementation phase, as is currently the case 
for EuropeAid.  
  
This would imply that the EEAS would have to 
develop a structure of policy units that would 
mirror the different areas of EU external actions, 
2 TEU, Art. 27.3
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Finally, there is the question of the incorporation 
of service in EU delegations into diplomatic 
careers at the level of member-states. As Simon 
Duke has rightly pointed out, “the evident danger 
of not striking the right co-operation balance 
is that the national diplomatic staff will view 
temporary assignment or secondment to the EU 
as a burden, with the consequences that the 
game becomes one of shifting burdens (notably 
consular) in the direction of the delegations and 
the downgrading of the prestige of service in 
the EEAS amongst national diplomats”.4 
  
For this reason, the recommendation, addressed 
to the Commission, Council Secretariat and 
member-states, to encourage suitable and 
interested staff to consider secondment to the 
EEAS, often more than once, as career-enhancing, 
should be seriously taken into account. The 
Commission, Council Secretariat and member-
states should release personnel for appropriate 
training and give priority to launching training 
programmes.5  
Democracy support in  
EU external relations:  
a new era? 
  
Democracy, as is acknowledged in the text 
of the Treaties, is Europe’s core value. Yet the 
role and the impact of democracy support on 
EU’s external relations have been somewhat 
less straightforward. As has been noted by 
Richard Youngs, Europe’s democracy support in 
external relations has not been consistent across 
geographic areas and instruments.6
4 Duke, Simon. The Lisbon Treaty and External Relations, 
EIPASCOPE no.1. Maastricht: European Institute of Public 
Administration, 2008, p.17
5 Crowe, Brian. The EAS Roadmap to Success. Chatham 
House Report. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
2008; Sola, Fernández, The European Union’s External 
Action Service. Working paper  46/2008. Madrid: Elcano 
Royal Institute, 2009, p. 26
6 Youngs, Richard, 2008: Is the EU Supporting Democracy 
in its Neighbourhood? Madrid: FRIDE/ECFR
new EC delegations will obtain a wider range 
of responsibilities. Similarly, the EC delegations 
will become a part of the EEAS and will work 
in close co-operation with member-states’ 
diplomatic and consular missions.3
  
However, this is not perceived as an 
unequivocally positive development. On the 
one hand, the member-states might be willing 
to let the EU missions substitute their own 
representations in certain countries as a result 
of financial considerations.  On the other 
hand, the strengthening of EU missions could 
result in overlaps without sufficient co-ordination 
between EU and national representations.  
  
Given the absence of clarity about what to expect 
of the new delegations in terms of their capacity 
to act on the ground and their functions, an 
intense debate on their composition is already 
underway. This debate is structured along two 
major issues: 
  
(a) The relative weight of different institutions 
in the composition of the new delegations; 
 
(b) The thematic distribution of desks within the 
delegation and its influence on delegations’ 
dealings with partner countries, particularly 
when it comes to potentially non-consensus 
issues such as trade and development 
assistance or human rights and democracy.  
  
More specifically, different policy communities 
have raised fears that specific thematic 
predominance in ED delegations will imbalance 
the priority focus of EU external actions in third 
countries, and more specifically in developing 
countries. This issue is particularly relevant for 
democracy support, as in the past this policy field 
has not enjoyed the necessary development of 
capacities at the level of the EC delegations.   
  
As in the case of the EEAS at the headquarters 
level, it is necessary to make sure not only that the 
functions of the delegations will include democracy 
support and the promotion of human rights, but 
that the staff seconded to the delegations will 
have sufficient capacity to work effectively on 
these issues, overcoming current limitations.  
3 Treaty on the Functioning of the Union (TFEU), Art.188
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of inequality in the region, nor devised 
mechanisms to build political consensus around 
potential policy reforms in partner countries.8
Furthermore, potentially positive developments, 
such as the Instrument for Stability, are 
hampered by cumbersome internal procedures 
and regulations that affect the capacity of EU 
institutions to support timely policy processes 
and institutional reforms that, more often than 
not, occur in rapidly changing political and 
social environments.    
  
Nevertheless, in such a diversified policy field, 
various positive developments in recent years 
are worth highlighting. Firstly, the development 
of the Governance Assessments Mechanism 
in the context of the relations between the 
EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries (ACP) has contributed to improving 
the capacities of EU institutions when engaging 
with partner countries in difficult political contexts 
and, therefore, the effectiveness of the mix of 
policy instruments.  
  
Secondly, in the field of Electoral Support, 
a change towards a more process-oriented 
approach can be observed. Rather than focusing 
exclusively on electoral observation, the EU’s 
electoral support is now evolving towards a 
more coherent and context-rich electoral cycle 
approach where elections are assessed and 
supported in the context of wider support for 
political and institutional reforms and processes, 
both before and after the electoral process. 
  
Thirdly, the development of more consistent 
methodologies for peace-building/peace-
keeping missions under the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, and the appointment of 
Special Representatives for particular regions 
(such as the Horn of Africa or Kosovo) where 
EU missions are deployed, have improved the 
capacity of the EU to co-ordinate security, and 
technical and political aspects of its interventions, 
in difficult political situations and regions beset 
by sharp social divisions. 
8 This gap has been widened as a result of the 
implementation, at the EU level, of the agenda of aid 
effectiveness and the development of co-operation modalities 
that stress state ownership of development processes but 
do not necessarily create the conditions for ownership and 
alignment that would result in a reinforcement of democratic 
processes in partner countries.
Whereas the pre-Accession mechanism can 
be taken as a major landmark in technical 
assistance and co-operation in support for 
institutional reform and implementation of 
the acquis communautaire in EU candidate 
countries, other policy schemes, such as the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (particularly 
in the Mediterranean region), have had a much 
more limited impact on supporting democratic 
reforms in third countries.  
  
The European Instrument for Democracy 
and Human Rights (EIDHR), an instrument 
allowing the EU to support directly civil society 
organisations working in the field of human 
rights and democracy in third countries, has 
been focused mostly on tackling human rights 
issues, whereas the “democracy work” has 
remained somewhat secondary. Moreover, in 
the dialogues established by European Union 
and Third Countries, human rights issues are 
generally addressed.7
  
Regional co-operation mechanisms funded 
under the Development Co-operation 
Instrument (DCI) also show diversified 
impact. However, there is generally a gap 
between the political goals and the scope of 
EU programmatic documents and strategic 
assessments and the actual instruments devised 
for the implementation, mostly focusing on 
technical assistance.  
  
An example of this is EU’s co-operation with Latin 
American and Caribbean Countries. Whereas 
at the strategic level the EU is committed to 
the promotion of social cohesion in the region 
and to tackling the sources of social inequality, 
policy instruments, such as the EUROsociAL 
Programme, have been constrained to promoting 
the exchange of best practice between public 
officials from Europe and Latin America. They 
have not addressed the political underpinnings 
7 Human rights work and democracy work are mutually 
reinforcing and necessary in order to support sound 
institutional and political reforms in third countries. However, 
whereas under the EIDHR the work on human rights has 
developed naturally, the Commission has found it somehow 
more difficult to tackle other questions, equally important 
for democratic transition and consolidation, such as 
supporting the role of political society in transitional contexts, 
restructuring party systems and party reforms, or investing in 
political and social leadership and capacity-building.
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problem that has serious repercussions both ad 
intra and ad extra.  
  
In sum, while it is difficult to assess the EU’s 
engagement in democracy support, beyond 
the evaluation of hardly comparable policy 
instruments, the immediate picture of the EU’s 
efforts in this field is one of scattered policy 
efforts, incoherence, and lack of co-ordination. 
The approval by the European Council of the 
Council Conclusions on Democracy Support in 
EU’s External Relations ushers in a window of 
opportunity for change. 
A New impetus?  
The Council Conclusions  
on Democracy Support in 
the EU’s External Relations 
  
The approval of the Council Conclusions on 
Democracy Support in the EU's External Relations 
on 17 November 2009 amounts to the climax 
of more than one year of debates within the 
policy community; debates that were led by 
the Czech and the Swedish Presidencies of 
the European Council, and where EU member-
states have played a dominant role. The final 
outcome, the Council Conclusions, establishes 
for the first time an overall policy framework, 
and establishes an Agenda for Action to support 
its implementation. 
  
  
WhAT ARE ThE  
COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS? 
  
The Council Conclusions aim at improving the 
coherence and effectiveness of EU instruments 
for democracy support. In doing so, the 
document outlines a set of shared principles 
and an Agenda for Action. 
  
As is recognised in Paragraph 2 of the Council 
Conclusions, in the field of democracy support, 
As is the case for many other policy fields, the 
development of EU instruments for supporting 
democracy is a complex policy area, where 
evolution has taken place through a long 
and often inconsistent process of aggregation 
of instruments and initiatives. This has not 
necessarily yielded positive outcomes when it 
comes to the implementation and development 
of the EU’s democracy support toolkit. 
The wide array of instruments that are listed in 
the democracy support toolkit, and the complex 
institutional setting of the EU, turn policy co-
ordination and coherence into a cumbersome 
exercise for EU officials both at headquarters 
and at country level, not to mention for partner 
countries and stakeholders.  
  
Furthermore, despite efforts by the EC to enhance 
the sources of information and country-based 
planning, the EC delegations seldom have 
enough capacity to translate policy guidelines 
and strategic recommendations designed at 
the headquarters into country-based action 
plans, tailored to the political and social context 
of the partner country.9  
  
This poses particular problems in the case of 
those instruments operating (fully or partially) in 
a decentralised manner. For example, recent 
analysis has shown that EC delegations have 
not been able to translate adequately general 
policy priorities established in the framework 
of EIDHR into the programmatic documents 
and calls for proposals of the Country-Based 
Support Schemes (CBSS). Some delegations 
simply copy policy priorities from the general 
EIDHR Strategy; others include policy priorities 
that are not consistent with the overall strategic 
recommendations for the country.10 
  
These various dynamics add up to a clear 
problem of visibility of democracy support 
efforts in the context of EU external relations; a 
9 In this respect, even if the Governance Assessments 
establish a new policy framework for the development of 
country-based strategies, the limited geographical scope 
and the limited implementation experience make it difficult to 
assess the potential of this instrument.
10 Herrero, Sonia, 2009: A decade of democracy 
promotion through the European Initiative for Democracy 
and Human Rights. The EPD Working Papers series in 
Democracy Support, 1/2009
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emphasizes the need for increased coherence, 
complementarity and co-ordination throughout 
the full range of actions and among different 
actors, as well as thematic and geographical 
instruments at the country level and at 
headquarters level.15  
According to the Council Conclusions, this 
should start from the country analysis stage 
and continue through planning, programming, 
implementation and evaluation of EU support, 
in order to achieve an appropriate mix of 
instruments according to the situation in a given 
country, and should be guided by dialogue 
with partner countries as appropriate.16  
  
Based on this programmatic declaration, the 
Council Conclusions proceed to establish an 
Agenda for Action aimed at giving EU institutions 
concrete recommendations for future action. 
  
ThE AgENDA fOR ACTION 
  
The Agenda for Action is the most important 
part of the Council Conclusions. It is structured 
as follows: firstly, a set of common values and 
principles are presented; secondly, policy 
recommendations are listed.   
  
According to the Council Conclusions, the 
following common values, norms and central 
principles form the basis of democracy support 
in the EU’s external relations:              
  
• Democracy, democratic governance, 
development and respect for all human 
rights – civil, cultural, economic, political 
and social – are interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing. 
  
• While there is no single model of democracy, 
democracies share certain common features. 
These include respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including the principle 
of non-discrimination, which ensures that 
everyone is entitled to the enjoyment of all 
human rights without discrimination as to race, 
15 Idem. Para. 4
16 Idem.
the EU and its member-states draw on strong 
parliamentary traditions, based on the role 
of national parliaments and regional and 
local assemblies in member-states, and of the 
European Parliament.11 
Similarly, the European Council recognises 
that democracy cannot be imposed from the 
outside. As is clearly stated in the document, 
the EU remains committed to the principles 
of ownership of development strategies and 
programmes by partner countries. Locally driven 
processes can be supported by an appropriate 
mix of financial and political instruments tailored 
to the specific situation of each country.12 
  
The EU’s democracy support activities thus aim 
at assisting the efforts, and strengthening the 
capacity, of governments, parliaments and other 
state institutions, political actors, civil society 
organisations, and other actors. EU efforts aim 
at contributing to sustainable development, 
respect for human rights, democratic 
governance, security, poverty reduction, and 
gender equality. 
  
In addition, the Council Conclusions clearly 
state that they do not seek to introduce new 
conditionality for EU development aid.13 As 
stated in the Council Conclusions, there is no 
need to re-negotiate existing norms, values 
and central principles as to what constitute the 
building blocks of democracy, nor to set out 
new policies.14  
  
The Council, however, affirms that there is room 
for improvement in how existing EU policies 
are implemented, and that policies should 
be applied more consistently and effectively 
in order to work better together as mutually 
enhancing parts of a coherent whole. 
  
To this extent, while acknowledging the multi-
dimensional, complex and long-term nature 
of democracy-building processes, the Council 
11 European Council: Council Conclusions on Democracy 
Support in the EU’s External Relations.
12 Idem. Para. 3
13 This was a very important point of the negotiations 
leading to the approval of the Council Conclusions, since 
conditionality clearly marks the border between existing 
sensitivities towards democracy support in EU member-states.
14 Idem.
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• A holistic approach on governance 
entails mainstreaming of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, democratic 
governance and the rule of law to all policy 
sectors, inter alia by implementing the EU 
guidelines for human rights dialogues, and by 
including human rights, democracy and the 
rule of law in discussions with third countries, 
in programming discussions, and in country 
strategy papers. 
  
These principles are further developed through 
the following policy recommendations: 
  
• Establishing a country-based approach.
  
• Reinforcing the capacities of EU institutions 
to engage in meaningful co-operation schemes 
with partner countries through partnership and 
political dialogue.
  
• Increasing the coherence and co-ordination 
of policy instruments both at the headquarters 
and the delegation level.  
  
• Improving mainstreaming of democracy and 
human rights in line with existing commitments, 
both from an institutional perspective and in 
policy and geographical/thematic instruments. 
  
• Improving co-operation mechanisms 
and co-ordination with other international 
organisations. 
  
• Bettering the visibility of democracy support in 
the overall framework of EC External Actions.  
  
Finally, the conclusions establish a mandate for 
the relevant EU institutions to put into practice 
the policy recommendations in a number of 
pilot countries and to report back to the Council 
by the end of 2010.  
sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, birth or other 
status. Democracy should ensure the rights of 
all, including the rights of persons belonging 
to minorities, of indigenous peoples and other 
vulnerable groups. 
• The ability of men and women to participate 
on equal terms in political life and in 
decision-making is a prerequisite of genuine 
democracy. 
  
• The principle of ownership of development 
strategies and programmes by partner 
countries is an essential element of the EU’s 
engagement on democracy support. 
  
• The EU supports the broad participation of 
all stakeholders in countries’ development 
and encourages all parts of society to take 
part in democracy building. 
  
• NGOs and other non-state actors of partner 
countries in particular play a vital role as 
promoters of democracy, social justice and 
human rights. 
  
• The essential oversight role of democratically 
elected citizens’ representatives is acknow-
ledged. Therefore, an increased involvement 
of national assemblies, parliaments and 
local authorities in domestic policy-making is 
encouraged. 
  
• The accountability of leaders and public 
officials to citizens is an essential element of 
democracy. In this context, the EU reiterates its 
support for the efforts to combat corruption. 
  
• Political dialogue is an important way in 
which to further development objectives and 
other external relations objectives. In the 
framework of the political dialogue, respect 
for democratic governance, human rights, 
democratic principles and the rule of law 
should be regularly assessed with a view to 
forming a shared understanding and identifying 
supporting measures. This dialogue has an 
important preventive dimension and aims to 
ensure these principles are upheld.17
17 Idem. Para. 17
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In other words, the document pushes 
practitioners and institutions alike to move from 
words to deeds and to put into practice a plan 
that, even though it is not fully developed in the 
text of the Agenda for Action, already contains 
enough elements for the policy community to 
know what type of actions are to be expected 
in the forthcoming months, particularly in the 
development of the pilot countries. This includes 
important issues such as: 
  
• Improving the instruments for strategic planning 
at the country level. 
  
• Bettering the process of policy dialogue with 
partner countries. 
  
• Linking ownership of development processes 
to the development of democratic practices and 
to more inclusive multi-stakeholder governance 
mechanisms. 
  
• Building a more sustainable and effective 
relationship between technical co-operation 
instruments and consensus in partner countries. 
  
• Working towards a better international 
division of labour in the field of democracy 
support.
  
  
Nevertheless, the Council Conclusions leave a 
number of very important issues unresolved: 
  
• To what extent can EU institutions take 
advantage of the changing policy environment to 
improve the mechanisms for its interactions with 
civil society organisations and stakeholders? 
  
• Is it possible to integrate civil society 
organisations, implementing agencies and EU 
institutions into a policy framework that goes 
beyond the current instrumental paradigm? 
  
• How can ownership of this policy agenda 
be spread amongst stakeholders in Europe 
and partner countries, while the policy debates 
have taken place within the selective club of EU 
member-states?  
  
A new hope… 
  
The EU’s democracy support has evolved in a 
piecemeal fashion. Scattered across diverse 
normative and political agendas, structured 
into a myriad of policy instruments, democracy 
support has evolved incrementally, yet without 
clearly established policy goals.  
  
The Council Conclusions raise the prospect of 
an end to this situation. The document seeks 
to improve the definition of the normative and 
operational grounds of EU involvement in 
democracy support. 
The Council Conclusions establish, for the 
first time, a framework for the development of 
democracy support as a core part of the EU’s 
external action efforts. 
  
As is often the case in EU legal documents, 
the lowest common denominator established 
in the Council Conclusions, though probably 
still vague and full of rhetoric, establishes 
sufficiently detailed policy elements to minimise 
the prospects that “business as usual” will be 
possible in the EU’s democracy support in the 
future. 
  
This does not imply that the role of democracy 
support in the architecture (either old or new) of 
the EU’s external relations has been clarified, 
but the Council Conclusions open up a much 
needed policy and political debate in the 
context of the EU’s external relations. 
  
Firstly, the Council Conclusions acknowledge 
the shortcomings of the democracy support 
policies in the EU. The document addresses the 
lack of policy coherence and co-ordination, 
while recognising the need for a more unified 
course of action, particularly when implementing 
policy instruments at the country level. 
  
Secondly, the Council Conclusions establish a 
clear mandate for the European Commission 
(or the relevant bodies in the new architecture) 
to focus policy discussions on the level of 
instruments for implementation at the country 
level. 
A network of independent policy centres  
in Central and Eastern Europe  
and Central Asia
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Paradoxically, whereas much of the credibility 
of the process lies in its capacity to implement 
the calendar established in the Council 
Conclusions, the bodies in charge of its 
implementation might not be in a position, 
anytime soon, to actually abide by the mandate 
established in the Council Conclusions.  
There is no easy way out of this situation. 
One step in the right direction could be that 
the member-states in charge of the recently 
launched trio of Presidencies (Spain, Belgium, 
and Hungary), working closely with the Office 
of the High Representative and the Council 
Secretariat, take the Council Conclusions on 
board and lead the establishment of a multi-
stakeholder dialogue mechanism that would 
ensure the continuity of the process during the 
transitional phase before the full implementation 
of the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. 
This mechanism could take the shape of an 
ad hoc grouping or panel of representatives 
of different stakeholders that would be in 
charge of:  
  
• Establishing a clear mandate for the 
implementation of the Council Conclusions (if 
necessary). 
  
• Monitoring the implementation of the Agenda 
for Action in the pilot countries. 
  
This grouping, whatever shape it takes, could 
develop its activities until the respective bodies 
at the EEAS and the European Commission are 
fully operational. At this point, the necessity of 
such an instrument could be re-assessed, and the 
mandate bestowed to such a grouping could 
be incorporated into the structure of division of 
labour established for the EU’s External Action. 
  
The Council Conclusions on Democracy Support 
in the EU's External Relations represent a new 
hope; and, all in all, a much more important 
innovation than the mere reshuffling of EU civil 
servants into the new EEAS. However, hope is 
not a plan. Much work needs to be done in 
order to fulfil the mandate of the conclusions, 
and to make this process compatible with the 
institutional changes brought about by the 
Lisbon Treaty. 
• To what extent will probable delays in the 
configuration of the new EEAS architecture 
hamper the implementation of the Council 
Conclusions, and how can we get around this 
issue if responsibilities, reporting lines, 
accountability mechanisms and division of labour 
are not clearly defined?
The architectural 
conundrum and the 
implementation of the 
Council Conclusions 
  
What will be the impact of architectural 
reform on the implementation of the Council 
Conclusions? 
While EU institutions and member-states 
negotiate the structure and the composition of 
the EEAS, the calendar for the implementation of 
the Council Conclusions has been announced. 
The document does not acknowledge the 
process of institutional restructuring, yet it has 
established a deadline, the end of 2010, to 
report on the implementation of the Council 
Conclusions in a number of pilot countries. 
Since it is a very ambitious timeline, it cannot 
be ruled out that delays in the structuring of the 
EEAS might hamper its implementation.  
  
It is not clear which institutions will be bound 
by the mandate established in the Council 
Conclusions. What is more, even if a decision 
is taken to implement pilot projects, it is not 
clear how the reporting mechanism should be 
put into practice, for the simple reason that it 
is not clear to whom the implementing bodies 
would report. 
Finally, with no clear division of tasks between 
the three EU “Top Jobs”, and between them and 
the member-states, the role of the different bodies 
and the member-states in the implementation 
and evaluation of the Council Conclusions 
remains unclear.   
Po
lic
y 
Br
ie
f N
o.
1
, 
2
0
1
0
12
www.pasos.org
This policy brief was written as part of the project, Return to Europe - Reflections After 20 Years of Democratic 
Renewal, carried out with the support of the Europe for Citizens Programme of the European Union, and of the 
International Visegrad Fund.
www.pasos.org
PASOS (Policy Association for an Open Society) promotes and protects open society values, including 
democracy, the rule of law, good governance, respect for and protection of human rights, and 
economic and social development, by supporting entities that individually and jointly foster public 
participation in public policy issues at the European Union level, in other European structures, and in 
the wider neighbourhood of Europe and Central Asia.
PASOS
Těšnov 3
110 00 Praha 1
Czech Republic
Tel/fax: +420 2223 13644
Email: info@pasos.org
www.pasos.org
PASOS is a not-for-profit organisation registered on 16 September 2004 with the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic
Registered office: Prokopova 197/9, 130 00 Praha 3, Czech Republic, DIC: CZ26675404
This project is being implemented by PASOS with the following project partners, all of which are PASOS 
members: the Center for Policy Studies at the Central European University, Hungary, the Institute of Public Affairs 
(ISP), Poland, and the Institute for Public Affairs (IVO), Slovak Republic.
